

THE IMPACT OF VARIABLE COMMITMENT IN THE NAMING GAME ON CONSENSUS FORMATION

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Outline



- Introduction
- Waning Commitment
- Increasing Commitment
- Distributed Commitment Strengths
- Conclusion



Binary Agreement Model (BAM)

There are two opinions **A**, **B**,
three states **A**, **B**, **AB**.

Rule 1: Accept new opinion (for listener)
The listener does **not** have this opinion, it adds the sent opinion to his list.




Rule 2: Reinforce common opinion (for both)
The listener already **has** this opinion, **both** retain **only** this opinion.



$$A \Leftrightarrow AB \Leftrightarrow B$$

Mean Field



- In a complete network, the fraction of agents
 - at state A is a ,
 - at state B is b ,
- The probability of this interaction is $x=ab$.
- After the interaction, B is changed to AB.
- $\frac{dB}{dt} = -x$, $\frac{dAB}{dt} = x$


Interactions

Prob. x	Before interaction		Message	After interaction		Updated Value
	Speaker	Listener		Speaker	Listener	
aa	A	A	A	A	A	
ab	A	B	A	A	AB	$dB=-x, dAB=x$
ac	A	AB	A	A	A	$dAB=-x, dA=x$
ab	B	A	B	B	AB	$dA=-x, dAB=x$
bb	B	B	B	B	B	
bc	B	AB	B	B	B	$dAB=-x, dB=x$
0.5ac	AB	A	A(50% chance)	A	A	$dAB=-x, dA=x$
0.5bc	AB	B	A(50% chance)	AB	AB	$dB=-x, dAB=x$
0.5cc	AB	AB	A(50% chance)	A	A	$dAB=-2x, dA=2x$
0.5ac	AB	A	B(50% chance)	AB	AB	$dA=-x, dAB=x$
0.5bc	AB	B	B(50% chance)	B	B	$dAB=-x, dB=x$
0.5cc	AB	AB	B(50% chance)	B	B	$dAB=-2x, dB=2x$



Commitment Naming Game

Rule 3: Committed agents do not change states.




- Critical value $p=p_c \sim 0.098$
- $p>p_c$: 1 fixed points
 - the consensus state : the system reaches a consensus
- $p<p_c$: 3 Fixed points:
 - the consensus state : the system reaches a consensus
 - saddle point: no consensus.
 - active steady state: no consensus but stable.

Jierui Xie, et al. Social consensus through the influence of committed minorities. 2011



Waning Commitment

Waning committed agent: a committed agent will become uncommitted when consecutively receiving w opposite opinion, where w is the commitment strength.



Example of Possible Interactions

Before Interaction	Message	After Interaction	Mean Field
$A \rightarrow A_0$	A	$A \rightarrow A_0$	
$A \rightarrow A_i$ ($i=1 \sim w-1$)	A	$A \rightarrow A_w$	$dA_i = -A \cdot A_i, dA_w = A \cdot A_i$
$A \rightarrow A_w$	A	$A \rightarrow A_w$	
$A \rightarrow B_0$	A	$A \rightarrow AB$	$dB_0 = -A \cdot B_0, dAB = A \cdot B_0$
$A \rightarrow B_1$	A	$A \rightarrow B_0$	$dB_1 = -A \cdot B_1, dB_0 = A \cdot B_1$
$A \rightarrow B_{j'}$ ($j'=2 \sim w'$)	A	$A \rightarrow B_{j'-1}$	$dB_{j'} = -A \cdot B_{j'}, dB_{j'-1} = A \cdot B_{j'}$
$A \rightarrow AB$	A	$A \rightarrow A_0$	$dAB = -A \cdot AB, dA_0 = A \cdot AB$
...



$$a_w r^w = 0$$

- w : the number of consecutive interactions to become uncommitted
- a_w : the fraction of committed agents at state A.
- $r = b+c/2$: the probability of a listener receiving opinion B
 - b : the fraction of all agents at state B
 - c : the fraction of all agents at state AB
- r^w : the probability of an listener consecutively receiving B w times
- $a_w r^w = 0$: no more committed agent becoming uncommitted




$$a_w r^w = 0$$

- When w is finite:
 - $r=0$ ($a=1, b=0, c=0$): consensus state A. All agents reach a consensus on opinion A.
 - $r=1$ ($a=0, b=1, c=0$): consensus state B. All agents reach a consensus on opinion B.
 - $0 < r < 1$ ($a=b, a_w=0$): unstable state.



Single Committed Group

Assuming the committed group commits to **A**, the uncommitted agents are initialized at state **B**



Critical Value Function

- Committed agents are lost at a rate of $da_w/dt = -a_w r^w$
- After t interactions the total number of committed agents will be approximately $a_w - a_w r^w t$
- Hence, we can assume that after times t_w , t_{w+1} , systems with commitment strengths w and $w + 1$ will be with the similar number of remaining committed agents



Critical Value Function

$$\begin{aligned} & p_c(w) - p_c(w)r^w t_w \\ & \approx p_c(w+1) - p_c(w+1)r^{w+1} t_{w+1} \approx \dots \\ & \approx p_c(\infty) - p_c(\infty)r^\infty t_\infty \\ & \approx p_c(\infty) \\ & p_c(w) \approx p_c(\infty) + p_c(w)r^w t_w \end{aligned}$$




Critical Value Function

- After plugin in the value of r , t_w and $p_c(\infty)$

$$\begin{aligned} p_c(w) &\approx p_c(\infty) + p_c(\infty)r^w t_w \\ &\approx 0.1 + 0.3 * 0.815^w \end{aligned}$$




Critical Value Function





Two competing committed groups

p_B is the initial committed B





p_A is the initial committed A



Increasing Commitment

Potential committed agent: an uncommitted agent will become committed when consecutively receiving w same opinion, where w is the commitment strength.



$$a_{0<a>}(1-r)^w=0$$

- w : the number of consecutive interactions to become committed
- $a_{0<a>}$: the fraction of potential committed agents at state A.
- $1-r = a+c/2$: the probability of a listener receiving opinion A
 - a : the fraction of all agents at state A
 - c : the fraction of all agents at state AB
- $(1-r)^w$: the probability of an listener consecutively receiving A w times
- $a_{0<a>}(1-r)^w=0$: no more uncommitted agent becoming committed




$$a_{0 < a} (1-r)^w = 0$$

- When w is finite:
 - $r=0$ ($a=1, b=0, c=0$): consensus state A. All agents reach a consensus on opinion A.
 - $r=1$ ($a=0, b=1, c=0$): consensus state B. All agents reach a consensus on opinion B.
 - $0 < r < 1$: unstable state or active steady state




Critical Value Function




Two competing committed groups

p_B is the initial B able to commit



p_A is the initial A able to commit



Conclusion

- Critical Value Function: $p_c(w) \approx kq^w + p_c(\infty)$
 - Waning commitment: $k > 0$, $q \sim 0.815$, $P_c(\text{inf}) \sim 0.1$
 - Increasing commitment: $k < 0$, $q \sim 0.32$, $P_c(\text{inf}) \sim 0.4$
- Phase Diagram:
 - Waning commitment: **beak** shape
 - Increasing commitment: the beak boundaries -> **straight lines**

Reference:

The impact of variable commitment in the Naming Game on consensus formation
 Xiang Niu, Casey Doyle, Gyorgy Korniss & Boleslaw K. Szymanski
 Scientific Reports 7, Article number: 41750 (2017)



THANK YOU!

Questions?



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