Shreyas Sekar

Graduate Student
Department of Computer Science
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Troy, NY.

Email

sekars [at] rpi [dot] edu
shreyas.sekar [at] gmail [dot] com

[Google Scholar Profile]

Greetings! I am a final year Ph.D student at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, being advised by Elliot Anshelevich. Broadly speaking, I am interested in Theoretical Computer Science, particularly problems involving the design of algorithms and incentives for large systems that interact with self-interested agents.

Specifically, my research tackles problems in the following areas:

Pricing Mechanisms for Markets
Optimization under Uncertainty and Risk-Aversion
Social Networks and Coalition Formation
Algorithmic Game Theory

During the first half of 2016, I was an intern at Microsoft Research, Cambridge, UK, where I worked with Peter Key and Ian Kash on the Economics of the Cloud. If you are interested in my work, please do get in touch.

Working
Papers

Sketching with Test Scores and Submodular Maximization [arxiv]
Shreyas Sekar, Milan Vojnovic and Se-Young Yun.

(Publications)

Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing [arxiv]
Elliot Anshelevich and Shreyas Sekar.
To appear in the Proceedings of [ACM EC 2017]: 18th ACM conference on Economics and Computation
Highlights: First known polylogarithmic-approximation algorithm for the problem of revenue maximization using static, item prices when buyers have Submodular, XoS valuations!

Posted Pricing sans Discrimination [arxiv]
Shreyas Sekar
To appear in the Proceedings of [IJCAI 2017]:26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets: Approximating Revenue and Welfare [pdf]
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar and Shreyas Sekar
To appear in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC). 2017; (conference version appeared in ICALP 2015)

Condorcet Consistent Bundling with Social Choice [abstract]
Shreyas Sekar, Sujoy Sikdar and Lirong Xia
To appear in the Proceedings of [AAMAS 2017]: 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems

Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets [arxiv]
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar and Shreyas Sekar
Proceedings of [WINE 2016]: 12th Conference on Web and Internet Economics

Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World [arxiv]
Elliot Anshelevich and Shreyas Sekar
Proceedings of [WINE 2016]: 12th Conference on Web and Internet Economics

Blindy, Greedy, and Random: Algorithms for Matching and Clustering using only Ordinal Information
[aaai] version | [arxiv] version with extensions and new results
Elliot Anshelevich and Shreyas Sekar
Proceedings of [AAAI 2016]: 30th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing [arxiv]
Elliot Anshelevich and Shreyas Sekar
Proceedings of [WINE 2015]: 11th Conference on Web and Internet Economics

Price Competition in Networked Networks: How do monopolies impact welfare? [arxiv]
with Elliot Anshelevich and Shreyas Sekar
Proceedings of [WINE 2015]: 11th Conference on Web and Internet Economics

(Preliminary Version in AGT@IJCAI-2015: 1st IJCAI Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory)

Envy-Free Pricing in Large Markets: Approximating Revenue and Welfare [arxiv]
Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar and Shreyas Sekar
Proceedings of [ICALP 2015]: 42nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming

Approximate Equilibrium and Incentivizing Social Coordination (2014) [arxiv]
Elliot Anshelevich and Shreyas Sekar
Proceedings of [AAAI 2014]: Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

(Other)

Exploiting the `Web of Trust' to Improve Efficiency in Collaborative Networks (2012) [arxiv]
Patrick Maillé and Shreyas Sekar

(Invited Talks)

Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization: How far can you go without price discrimination?
April 2017 CS Theory Seminar, University of Washington, Seattle.
Algorithms for Fair Pricing: How to maximize revenue without compromising on buyer happiness
April 2015 IBM T.J Watson Research Center, NY, USA.